Museum Weapons, Military Resources, & Battle Sites for this Weaponry

1932 United States Army Sabre/Sword

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Prior to the 20th century, the swords and sabers of US Army officers differed according to rank, branch, or arm of service of individual officers. They carried their weapons during all military duty occasions,
other than stable and fatigue. In 1902 a new standard saber was adopted and prescribed for all officers regardless of rank or branch, except chaplains (who carried no sidearms). The new saber belonged with the service uniform when the officer went on duty under arms or with the dress uniform on certain formal occasions. The pistol replaced the saber as a field arm by 1912.

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​During the early 1930s, the saber and its accouterments became prescribed articles for service and dress uniforms. Sabers were worn for ceremonies and "on all occasions on duty under arms," except when in the field. (Only cavalry officers when on mounted duty carried sabers in the field.) Col James A. Moss, the Army's unofficial custom arbiter, recommended to newly appointed officers that they purchase saber
and scabbard before reporting to their first duty stations

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After 1934, US Army regulations for the service uniform contained no mention of the saber (see, for example AR 600-40, 28 Aug 1941). Dress uniform regulations for officers continued to include it (See AR 600-38, 17 Aug 1938). However, with the approach to war, the War Dept no longer required officers to purchase sabers (Circular No 108, 30 Sep 1940, Sec III), but Col Moss in the 1941 ed of his Officer's Manual continued to recommend new officers purchase a dress saber chain (pp. 31-33). More in tune with the changing times, the competing Officers' Guide, (6th ed, 1941, U133M74, p. 156) carried the War Dept announcement of 8 Nov 1940 on the discontinuance of saber instruction for officers.  After World War II, the saber appears to have become an optional item of officer's equipment. If prescribed, it constituted part of the full-dress uniforms or, possibly, even the garrison uniform.

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1938 Carbine Weapons

In 1938, the Army Chief of Infantry requested the development of a carbine meeting these capabilities. By 1941, major firearms manufacturers, including Winchester, had submitted prototypes firing an innovative intermediate .30 caliber cartridge. The design by David Marshall “Carbine” Williams, with its short-stroke piston, was ultimately selected. This became the famous semi-automatic M1 carbine, formally adopted in 1941. Weighing only 5 pounds with an 18-inch barrel, the M1 carbine provided crucial portable firepower out to 300 yards for support troops and vehicle crews.

The M1 carbine saw its combat debut in 1942, proving effective in the hands of airborne troops during the invasion of Sicily. Its lightweight design allowed it to be readily air-dropped in a special padded container. The carbine’s short length was also advantageous in the close-quarters fighting of the Italian campaign.

In the Pacific theater, Marine units found the M1 carbine met their requirements for a weapon smaller than the standard M1 rifle in the dense jungle terrain. The carbine offered more sustained firepower than pistols or submachine guns when short distances and sudden close engagements were common.

During the Battle of the Bulge in 1944, many support troops, including cooks and clerks, found themselves suddenly on the front lines, relying on their issued M1 carbines to hold back German attacks. The semi-auto fire, low recoil, and 10-round magazine capacity enabled rapid volleys, while the carbine’s small size could be maneuvered and fired from improvised field fortifications.

Selective-fire models emerged from the request of Lieutenant Colonel Rene Studler, who recognized the need for both semi-auto and full-auto modes of fire. The M2 carbine with these dual capabilities was issued in late 1944, followed by the improved M3 in 1945. They remained in service during the Korean War, where their high rate of fire was valued.​

 

Solomon Islands Campaign and Native Weapons against the Japanese

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Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor precipitated the United States’ entry into World War II. In the Pacific, the Solomon Islands — particularly Guadalcanal — became the epicenter of fierce fighting between the Japanese and the United States. Little mentioned in popular discourse on the Solomon Islands Campaign is the contributions made by indigenous Solomon Islanders — who served as coastwatchers, scouts and laborers under Allied military units. When mentioned, indigenous islanders are cast as “loyal helpers,” a description that doesn’t consider the complex motivations behind Islanders’ service. Moreover, while the impact of the war on the Islands was immense, it is not often discussed through the local perspective.

In Solomon Islanders in World War II: An Indigenous Perspective (ANU Press, 2017), Anna Annie Kwai aims to bring the Solomon Islander war experience to the forefront with all the nuance it deserves. In an interview with The Diplomat, Kwai explains the strategic significance of the Solomon Islands and the varied motivations for Islanders’ participation.

For readers who may be unfamiliar, what strategic role did the Solomon Islands play in World War II?

Immediately following Pearl Harbor, the Japanese swiftly advanced into the southwestern Pacific along the New Guinea coast and islands, and into the Solomons with little resistance. The Japanese presence in the Solomons, especially the airfield they built on Guadalcanal, threatened to cut communication and shipping between Australia and the United States, isolating Australia and rendering her exposed to a possible Japanese invasion. Alarmed, the U.S. chose Guadalcanal as its first counterpunch on land, landing the 1st Marines Division at Lunga on August 7, 1942. The ensuing six-month campaign was a bloody struggle with the outcome very much in doubt for the first few months. Allied gains and eventual victory proved to be one of the main turning points of the Pacific War, with Japan being drained of men, ships and equipment, and having diverted so much energy and attention to Guadalcanal. Japan was forced to withdraw from the Kokoda Track in November 1942, abandoning plans to take Port Moresby. This was the beginning of the end for the Japanese in the southwestern Pacific.

Prior to WWII, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) had put a coast-watching network in place in the Solomons, as an intelligence gathering platform that used civilians with radios to report any suspicious development in their assigned areas. District officers, plantation owners, and missionaries were given military titles and enlisted in the RAN as Coastwatchers. At the outset of war, as Japanese troops invaded the Solomons group, Coastwatchers went into hiding in the bush and began reporting on enemy movements to Allied headquarters. The Coastwatchers’ work was so significant in winning the Solomons Campaign that US Admiral William “Bull” Halsey, commander of the South Pacific Area, proclaimed that, “the Coastwatchers saved Guadalcanal and Guadalcanal saved the Pacific.”

You write that when Solomon Islanders’ involvement in the war is mentioned in histories (most often written by outsiders), the Islanders have often been cast as “loyal” to the Allied cause. Does this description oversimplify Islanders’ participation in the war?

The success story of the Coastwatchers has been celebrated extensively. Numerous books have been written about how brave the Coastwatchers were and how significant their work was to the Allied victory in the Solomons Campaign. But details of the foundation of this success – the role played by local Solomon Islanders – have been underreported and simplified. The 23 Coastwatchers in the Solomons archipelago (including Bougainville) relied heavily on the support of the local people. This widespread support is often referred to as simply “loyalty.”

When loyalty is highlighted this way, it raises the question, loyalty to whom, and why? The first part of the question is easy; Solomon Islanders were overwhelmingly loyal to the Coastwatchers and the Allies. Due to this loyalty, Coastwatchers were able to function effectively behind enemy lines, Allied soldiers were saved and the Allies won the campaign. But viewing Islander involvement through the Western lens of “loyalty” simplifies complex motivations. To an extent, the notion of loyalty implies that islanders were unthinkingly submissive to their colonial “masters,” with a hierarchical connotation that is often racial in nature. But asking “why,” unlocks the complexities of the story that only Solomon Islanders can tell, and that is the side of the story that provides insight into the different motivations for islander involvement in the war.

Can you describe some of the divergent motivations for Islanders to contribute to the war effort?

Indigenous wartime involvement was inspired by various factors, some pushing through perceived duty or responsibility and some pulling through attraction. There was a sense of familiarity and obligation toward the longstanding British colonial administration, so despite Japanese propaganda casting themselves as anti-colonial liberators, when Japanese troops invaded the Solomons they were immediately regarded as outsiders and “enemies.” But the war was also a very new and exciting event that fueled the curiosity of local men and prompted them to take part. The easy abundance of food in labor camps at Lunga and elsewhere was another draw, and the attraction of paid wages lured many men from their villages. There was also a sense of prestige attained from joining ranks with the Allied soldiers and sailors as fellow warriors.

But there were more coercive factors that drove local participation that shouldn’t be ignored. Some Coastwatchers imposed harsh punishments upon mere suspicion of any sympathy for or collaboration with Japanese troops. This at times included casual behavior by islanders that was interpreted as suspicious. Punishments imposed by some Coastwatchers included severe beatings unrealistic for the “crime” committed. This was done with the intention to instill fear in the minds of locals, in order to deter contact of any sort with Japanese troops.

How did the war impact postwar administration of the Islands? In what ways did the wartime experience contribute to the postwar anti-colonial movement?

Prior to the war, the colonial government was headquartered on the small island of Tulagi. Upon the Japanese invasion it was moved out of harm’s way, to Auki on Malaita. As soon as American forces landed on the island of Guadalcanal on August 7, 1942, the government moved to Lunga. Despite controversy, the postwar administration moved to Honiara (on Guadalcanal) where the capital city is currently located. This was to take advantage of war infrastructure, including Henderson Field (now the international airport), roads, and structures that were readily available. The placement of the capital on Guadalcanal planted the seeds for much of the problems that would eventually erupt into the “Tensions” of 1998-2002.

The war itself was an eyeopener for islanders. It provided islanders with the opportunity to interact with soldiers of different nationalities and race on a personal level that was not possible under the colonial administration. This made islanders question their experiences and encounters with white members of the colonial government. For the first time islanders were able to drive the same machines that white men drove, share the same food that white soldiers had, and feel a certain degree of empowerment. This exposure aggravated islanders’ grievances of inequality experienced under the colonial administration. So even during the war, islanders began to protest for an increase in their wages. From these feelings of inequality and injustice the famous sociopolitical movement Ma’asina Rule was formed. In the aftermath of the war, the fight for equality and recognition shifted to a fight for political autonomy from Great Britain, and 33 years after the war ended Solomon Islands finally gained independence (in 1978).

In the Solomon Islands today, how is the war commemorated? What is the linkage between Islanders’ war memorials and nation-building?

War commemoration in Solomon Islands has only recently shifted in focus to the remembrance of local participation in the war. Observances have always been the affair of the Americans or the Japanese, but recently the recognition of local involvement in the war was brought into annual commemorative events. This is because there is now more public awareness and education on the roles of Solomon Islanders during the war. Monument building is part of this awareness, and is a significant symbol of unity within a broader contemporary Solomon Islands society. This sense of unity was initiated by our ancestors during the difficult times of the war and grew throughout the journey to political independence. It is one of the pillars of our patriotism to our country. Islanders’ war memorials, in this regard, are symbolic of a unified sense of nationhood, and gratitude to those who laid the foundation for Solomon Islands sovereignty.

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Japanese World War II Assault Rifles

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It is almost impossible to correct factual errors about guns that have been repeated for decades. A most persistent error of fact is that the Imperial Japanese Army’s (IJA) World War II small arms were crude, poorly made and dangerous to fire – junk. They were not; at least not until the last-ditch rifles were made near war’s end, and it’s doubtful if any of those saw action.

Members of crew-served weapons teams were often issued carbines. Shown is a Type 44 6.5mm carbine with a bayonet. The light machine gun is a Type 99 7.7mm that was also issued with a bayonet.
Members of crew-served weapons teams were often issued carbines. Shown is a Type 44 6.5mm carbine with a bayonet. The light machine gun is a Type 99 7.7mm that was also issued with a bayonet.
At left is an Imperial Japanese Army Type 97 6.5mm sniper rifle. At right is a Type 99 7.7mm sniper rifle.

Prewar-manufactured rifles and carbines, collectively nicknamed Arisakas, had metal work and finish on a par with most nations’ military bolt actions. Although, their stock wood was never equal to good American walnut on Model 1903 Springfields or the laminated wood Germany started using on midwar K98k Mausers.
The above should not be construed to mean the IJA fought with perfect small arms. However, their faults were not in workmanship; they were in design and doctrine for use. In regard to doctrine, Japanese officers considered rifles as little more than handles for bayonets. This fact dovetails with the stress of officers who were trained for night fighting. Aimed fire with rifles at night is a near impossibility, so hetai (infantrymen) training centered upon closing with the enemy and using bayonets.

At the war’s beginning, which for Japan was 1937 on mainland China, the standard-issue infantry rifle was the Type 38 6.5x50mm that had been adopted in 1905. It was a Mauser ’98-style bolt action with a five-round integral box magazine loaded by means of stripper clips. In basic form, Type 38s differed from most Mauser military rifles only in detail. Instead of a circular knob on the bolt handle, they had an elongated version. The safety was a large, knurled steel cap at the end of the bolt. Moving it with your fingers is awkward for shooters used to a pivoting lever as found on most military Mausers, because the Japanese safety was meant for rotation by the palm of the hand. There is a small notch in the bolt cap. When the small notch is pointed to the left, the rifle is ready to fire. When it is moved to the 12 o’clock position, the rifle is set to “safe” and the bolt is locked shut. Another Type 38 feature that puts many modern shooters off is that the firing pin is cocked when closing the bolt.

If a Japanese rifle or carbine has the chrysanthemum ground off the receiver, it means the gun was handed out postwar from Japanese stock.  If a Japanese rifle or carbine has the chrysanthemum ground off the receiver, it means the gun was handed out postwar from Japanese stock.  As stated, rifles were considered bayonet handles, so Type 38s were fitted with 31.5-inch barrels for an overall length of 50 inches and a weight of about 9 pounds. Sights on most Type 38s included a simple open rear and a blade front with strong “wings” to protect it from damage in bayonet duels. The Type 38 rifle’s rear sight in my collection is a peep style, but instead of being near the shooter’s eye, it’s out on the barrel where open sights are usually located. I have found that when shooting with the peep sight that far out, it works fine for slow fire, but in rapid-fire shooting it is easy to “acquire” one of the front sight’s “wings” in the peep instead of the sight blade.
There were three other variations of the basic Type 38 6.5x50mm. The Type 97 sniper rifle is merely a Type 38 in all dimensions, but with a quick-detachable scope mounted to a rail on the left side of the action. The 2.5x scope is positioned to the left of the bore instead of directly over it. This makes using the iron sights possible at all times, and clears the action for loading with five-round stripper clips. Furthermore, neither scope nor mounts have any sort of adjustment. (Remember that Japanese rifles were deficient in design, not craftsmanship.) IJA doctrine required the scope to be carried in a hard case by the sniper and it was only installed when action was imminent.

To compensate for a lack of adjustability, the scope reticles had many lateral and numbered vertical hash marks on the crosshairs. IJA sniper training taught soldiers to use those markings to compensate for trajectory at various ranges, or for windage changes. Since the scoped rifles were zeroed at arsenals prior to being issued to troops, they probably were not perfectly zeroed at any distance for individual snipers. More likely, sniper trainees were told to memorize the various hash marks that put them “on” at specific distances. After several hundred rounds and uncounted hours attempting to shim my Type 97’s scope mount in order to zero it perfectly, I gave up. It never stayed zeroed, and I found it easier to memorize the hash marks.

Going back to doctrine, the use of snipers by the IJA was radically different from most World War II armies. Most armies’ sniper doctrine required long shots from chosen “hides” so there was a good chance of survival. For Japanese snipers, being sent into combat was nearly an assured death sentence. The soldiers were meant to stay in position, hopefully taking several enemies, until killed.

One often criticized feature of Japanese rifles and carbines is the spliced buttstock. They were built this way due to the lack of hardwood on Japanese islands.  One often criticized feature of Japanese rifles and carbines is the spliced buttstock. They were built this way due to the lack of hardwood on Japanese islands.  Two 6.5x50mm carbines were fielded by the IJA. The Type 38 carbine was simply a Type 38 rifle with a shortened 19-inch barrel and a weight of 7.5 pounds. The Type 38 carbine in my collection has an open rear sight with graduations from 400 to 2,000 meters. Some Type 38 carbines were issued with the same peep sight arrangement mentioned above. The Japanese did not forget about their fondness for edged weapons, type 38 carbines accept the same bayonets as rifles.

In 1911 another Type 44 carbine was introduced. It was designed specifically for horse cavalry. Also chambered for 6.5x50mm, it was based on the basic Type 38 action. Type 44s featured an integrated folding bayonet, increasing its weight to a full 9 pounds and making it perhaps World War II’s heaviest carbine. Besides horse troops, Japan didn’t differ greatly from other nations’ use of carbines; carbines were issued to crew-served mortar and machine gun teams primarily for self-defense. Their primary job was to keep the mortars and machine guns in action.

By 1939 Japan had been fighting in the vastness of China for two years. Experiences there convinced ordnance officers that a new rifle and cartridge were needed. The rifle needed to be shorter and lighter, and its cartridge needed to pack more punch for fighting at longer ranges. The result was the Type 99 7.7x58mm rifle. Type 99s used the same Mauser-style action but with barrels slightly shorter than 26 inches. Weight was reduced by about 12 ounces. Some shorter-than-standard Type 99 experimental rifles were tested, but there were no carbine-length Type 99s issued.
Original IJA military rounds include (left to right): the 6.5x50mm semi-rimmed, 7.7x58mm semi-rimmed, 7.7x58mm rimless and the 7.7x56mm rimmed that was used only by the Japanese Navy in Lewis Light Machine Guns.

Two other changes were made in this new rifle, neither of which would have been the idea of an experienced rifleman. One was a wire monopod that folded under the forestock. It might have been beneficial on a level rifle range, but on the uneven terrain of battlefields it was nearly worthless. IJA troops also thought so, because those monopods were missing from most Type 99s that were battlefield pickups. Also missing from many battlefield-recovered IJA rifles were their sliding action covers. The purpose of these was to keep the actions free of dust and dirt, but in the terrain in which most of Japan’s group fighting occurred, they merely provided something else to hang up on foliage.  The other useless feature was contained in the rear sight. Again, it was a peep sight placed far out on the barrel, but in this instance, it was designed with graduated “arms” that folded out from each side of the basic sight. Their purpose was to provide lead when aiming at low-flying airplanes. Never mind that by World War II airplanes engaged in strafing troops while passing by at 200 to 300 miles per hour.

Type 99s were also made into sniper rifles, with the most common using nonadjustable mounts and nonadjustable 2.5x scopes. On hand are Type 99 sniper rifles, and their scope reticles are different from the Type 97s, but they still have hash marks. Special Type 99s were also made just for paratroopers. They can be taken down by removing a simple wedge that holds the barrel to the receiver. Otherwise they are exactly the same as a standard Type 99. When shooting the two versions side by side, I could see no difference in potential accuracy.

Perhaps one common feature on all Japanese World War II rifles and carbines that led to the idea they were substandard was a jointed buttstock. The Japanese islands did not provide a great deal of suitable hardwoods for making gunstocks, so splicing a piece on the bottom of the buttstock became a standard wood-saving technique.  The 6.5x50mm cartridge was introduced as early as 1897 with a 162-grain RN bullet at about 2,300 fps. By World War II, the standard load consisted of a 139-grain spitzer at about 2,500 fps. It was the smallest infantry rifle cartridge issued to major nations’ troops in World War II. The 7.7x58mm was a great leap up. Its 179-grain spitzer bullet had a velocity of 2,450 fps. Just for information, that load was the near-ballistic twin of the British .303 (174-grain bullet at 2,450 fps).

As to modern handloading, the two cartridges are as different as day and night. I have loaded for a half-dozen 6.5mms to date, and four 7.7mms; the latter is easy. It’s a rimless case just like a .30-06 and takes .311- or .312-inch bullets. Prvi Partisan offers very good quality and reasonably priced brass. (Because I also own a Type 99 Light Machine Gun in this caliber, I bought 1,000 cases from Buffalo Arms of Sandpoint Idaho.) Full-length sized, they chamber fine in all the Type 99 rifles. My favorite powder for the 7.7x58mm is IMR-4350 with a 50-grain charge for all 174- to 180-grain bullets.

Comparatively, the 6.5x50mm can present problems. It is semi-rimmed to headspace on the rim, but chambers in all 6.5x50mms that I have shot are greatly oversize. Prvi Partisan also makes this brass, but when full-length sized, I’ve only been able to get about three reloadings before signs of case separation appear. Neck sizing only would likely alleviate this, but with four 6.5x50mm rifles and carbines currently on hand, sorting out cases for each can be a hassle. My favorite load for this cartridge includes one or another 139- or 140-grain spitzer over 37.0 grains of IMR-4350.

Ironically, the Japanese were not happy with their 6.5mm for long-distance fighting in China, so they adopted the 7.7mm. Then, a great portion, perhaps most, of their fighting against the U.S., Great Britain and Australia occurred in the jungle-covered Pacific islands and/or Southeast Asia, where fighting distances were often measured in feet instead of yards. For Japan’s soldiers, the mild recoil, negligent smoke and almost nonexistent muzzle flash of the 6.5x50mm was a better choice.
Here’s another situation that had to give IJA supply officers headaches. During the war, Japan fielded Type 96 (6.5mm) and Type 99 (7.7mm) Light Machine Guns. Troops that required carbines had 6.5mms, but soldiers using full-length infantry rifles could have been equipped with either 6.5mm or 7.7mm rifles. Then there’s the matter of Japan’s Type 92 Heavy Machine Guns, which Americans called the “woodpecker” due to its slow rate of fire at 400 rounds per minute. That gun required a 7.7x58mm semi-rimmed cartridge. I have read that Type 99 rifles would accept this semi-rimmed 7.7mm – they will not. I’ve tried it with original ammunition. According to a U.S. manual titled Japanese Infantry Weapons (December 31, 1943), the woodpecker does function with rimless 7.7mms. So add that to the list of IJA supply officers’ problems. (Interestingly, that same U.S. manual states that both Type 38 and Type 99 rifles were battle-zeroed for 300 meters.)

Finally, how do the Japanese rifles and carbines stack up against others from World War II? The average U.S. Model 1903 .30-06 or German K98k 8mm is capable of better precision than either a Type 38 or Type 99. In my experience, ’03s and K98ks in good condition will group in the range of 1½ to 3 MOA. Arisakas, on the other hand, have mostly grouped into 3 to 4 MOA. That said, the difference under field conditions is likely of little consequence. Of course, M1 Garands were better than any of the bolt actions for their purposes. The Japanese carbines were as serviceable as Germany’s G33/40 8mm and provided considerably less recoil, but the U.S. M1 .30 Carbine was a world apart. The bottom line isn’t that the Japanese lost World War II because their rifles and carbines were junk. They lost because they started a war with an industrial giant whose production of ships, airplanes and vehicles could not have been equalled.

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Modern Use of Mortars 

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His M19 60 mm mortar had been designed to replace the M2 mortar of World War II and fired the same ammunition. Rejected by the Army, the M19 was favored by the Marines — even though 10 pounds heavier, shorter-ranged and less accurate than the M2 — because it had sights and a manual trigger that enabled the crew to aim it at a specific target for “direct fire” and not just lob shells at an unseen target using “indirect fire.”

The M19 had an M5 rectangular base plate and a bipod that supported the muzzle-loaded smoothbore barrel. Crewmen could anchor the mortar tube in a helmet if a base plate wasn’t available. The sight was an M4 collimator sight, which allows the viewer to see an illuminated aiming point aligned with the weapon, regardless of eye position.

The mortar was fired manually using a “firing lever” trigger for direct fire at low angles of elevation. When the tube elevation exceeded 60 degrees, the projectile was dropped into the tube and fired when its ignition cartridge struck the firing pin. Range was set by adjusting the tube’s elevation and clipping “booster charges” to the tail fin — four for maximum range.

The M19 was a company-level weapon for U.S. and South Vietnamese marines, filling the indirect-fire gap between the M79 grenade launcher and the 81 mm battalion-level mortars. Never as popular as its M2 predecessor, the M19 gave way to the M224 60 mm mortar by the early 1980.

 

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